Introduction
The question addressed is whether there is association between the size of a bank and its risk. Prior studies have mixed findings as to determinants of bank risk (using risk measures such as share price volatility and default), with independent variables including a variety of balance sheet and profitability items. Several studies consider diversification of bank income sources as a determinant of bank risk (for example, Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006; Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002; De Young & Roland, 2001; Saunders & Walter, 1994; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006) . Other studies find that balance sheet and income statement items or ratios provide little explanation of bank risk, and that changes in volatility and default are often caused by external shocks or contagion. Several studies have considered the contagion aspect (for example, Das, Duffie, Kapadia, & Saiata, 2007; Davis & Lo, 2001; Giesecke & Weber, 2004 , 2006 Jorion & Zhang, 2007; Liao & Chang, 2010; Lonstaff & Rajan, 2008; Rosch & Winterfeldt, 2008) . There are also some notable studies which look at determinants of bank capital (Gropp & Heider, 2009; Kuo, 2003; Ngo, 2008; Rime, 2001) which have common independent variables to those used by the abovementioned studies of determinants of bank volatility and default.
Although we focus predominantly on one of these variables (size), in addition to investigating whether there is correlation between size (on it's own) and bank risk, we examine whether size, in conjunction with other variables, is a significant determinant of bank risk. We examine the period from 2000 -2008, and also split our analysis between pre-GFC and GFC to see whether 'major' banks fared better or worse during different economic circumstances as compared to smaller banks. Four regions are examined; Australia, Canada, US and Europe. We have chosen these 4 regions as this mix provides us with two distinctively different banking industry characteristics. Australia and Canada are smaller global regions, both of which are considered to have fared relatively well during the GFC, with banks remaining profitable and well capitalised. The USA and Europe, on the other hand are the largest two banking regions, both of which had substantial problems during the GFC, with many banks experiencing losses and shortages of capital.
We use four measures of risk. 
VaR and CVaR
VaR's use in the banks escalated since adoption by Basel as the primary measure for calculating market risk capital requirements. The metric measures potential losses over a specific time period at a given level of confidence. Internationally, there is extensive literature coverage about VaR. Examples include RiskMetricsTM (1994 RiskMetricsTM ( , 1996 who introduced and popularised VaR, Jorion (1996) , and comprehensive discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR Modeling Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a Handbook ( , 2009b . In summary, there are 3 methods applied for calculating VaR. The Variance-Covariance (parametric) method estimates VaR on the assumption of a normal distribution. The Historical method groups historical losses in categories from best to worst and calculates VaR on the assumption of history repeating itself. Monte Carlo Simulation simulates multiple random scenarios. In order to exclude the possibility of distortion of results due to sensitivity to the method chosen, we use all 3 methods.
As the parametric method assumes returns are normally distributed, to obtain VaR for a single asset X, all that needs to be calculated is the mean and standard deviation (ơ).
Using standard distribution tables, and given the normal curve assumption, we automatically know where the worst 1% and 5% lie on the curve: 95% confidence = -1.645ơ x and 99% confidence = -2.330ơ x . When calculating VaR, it is usual practice (as used by RiskMetrics) to not use actual asset figures, but the logarithm of the ratio of price relatives (the ratio between today's price and the previous price):
(1)
The historical method calculates daily asset returns the same way as the parametric method per equation 1. Instead of assuming a normal distribution, the actual 5 th percentile value is taken as VaR at 95% confidence level. Because historical weightings in a portfolio can change, distorting current portfolio VaR, it is usual practice to use historical simulation whereby the value of the portfolio is calculated assuming constant weightings (based on current portfolio weightings, for which we use market capitalisation) for each day in the period.
Monte Carlo analysis generates future simulated prices, assuming a random walk.
Using closing prices, mean and standard deviation of returns, thousands of random variables are generated (we use 20,000) which are then used to calculate VaR, with the 95 th lowest value in the simulation being VaR at the 95% confidence level.
A key criticism of VaR is that it says nothing of risk beyond VaR. Critics include Standard and Poor's analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency of VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical properties; such as lack of sub-additivity. Criticism of VaR mounted since the GFC onset with VaR perceived as focussing on historical risk and not measuring tail risk.
In addition to VaR, this paper examines CVaR which considers losses beyond VaR.
If VaR is calculated at 95%, CVaR is the average of the 5% extreme returns. Pflug (2000) showed CVaR to be a coherent measure, not containing the undesirable properties of VaR. CVaR has been used in an Australian setting by Allen and Powell (2007) , who find significant correlation between VaR and CVaR in ranking risk among Australian sectors prior to the GFC and Powell and Allen (2009) who use CVaR to show how relative risk changed among sectors since the onset of the GFC.
DD, CDD, PD and CPD
The prior section explained VaR and CVaR which we use to measure market risk, a key component of asset price fluctuations. These in turn, are important to measuring distance to default (DD) and probability of default (PD) using the Merton structural methodology. The Merton model is based on the option pricing methodology of Black & Scholes (1973) . The model uses fluctuations in market asset values combined with asset and debt levels of a firm to measure DD (measured by number of standard deviations). The firm defaults when asset values fall below debt levels.
In the Merton model, equity and the market value of the firm's assets are related by:
Where E = market value of firm's equity, V = market value of firm's assets, F = face value of firm's debt,r = instantaneous risk free rate, N = cumulative standard normal distribution function, and T = selected time horizon 
µ = an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm's assets, which can be calculated as the mean of the change in lnV (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) .
Probability of Default (PD) can be determined using the normal distribution. For example, if DD = 2 standard deviations, we know there is a 95% probability that assets will vary between 1 and two standard deviations. There is a 2.5% probability that they will fall by more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the cumulative standard normal distribution function, PD is measured as:
Moody's KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003 ) is a popular model used by banks to measure PD. KMV calculates DD based on the Merton approach, but instead of using a normal distribution to calculate PD, KMV use their own worldwide database to determine PD associated with each default level. In KMV, debt is taken as the value of all short-term liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt outstanding. T is usually set as 1 year. The approach to calculating σ v, as per KMV and Bharath and Shumway (2008) and (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) involves first estimating σ of equity from historical data (as we have done in section 3), and then applying an iterative procedure. An initial asset value can be estimated as
For each trading day, V is computed by applying σ E to equation 5. Thus we obtain daily values for V every day. The daily log return is calculated and σ of asset returns calculated, which is then used as V for the next iteration to estimate new asset values.
This process is repeated until asset returns converge to 10E-3. Once we obtain the converged value of σ V , we back out V through equation 2.
We use the same definition as KMV for debt and also set T to 1 year. We also use same iterative process as described above for estimating σ v . In line with Vassalou and Xing (2004) , we calculate µ as the annual mean of change in lnV. The risk free rate used is the annual average 1 year indicative mid rate for selected Commonwealth Government securities as provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia (2009).
We have modified the Merton model to incorporate a CVaR approach due to the fact that firms are most likely to default under extreme circumstances. Instead of using the standard deviation of all asset returns, we use the standard deviation of the worst 5%
of returns (which we label CStdev) to calculate conditional distance to default (CDD) and conditional probability of default CPD (default conditional upon asset values fluctuating at the extreme 5% level):
Data and Methodology
Having explained the VaR, CVaR, DD and PCD metrics, this section now proceeds to explain our data selection, and how these metrics will be used in this study.
Data
We examine all listed banks in each of the four regions for which there is sufficient data (a minimum of 5 years, giving 2 years in the GFC period and at least 3 years pre-GFC) on Datastream.
Although there are 58 banks in Australia, only 13 are Australian owned banks according to APRA (with assets of AUD $2.3 trillion totalling 88% of all banking assets in Australia), the remaining 12% being foreign bank branches. At 2008, the ASX showed 12 listed banks with Macquarie was classified 'Diversified Financials".
We include Macquarie, due to being classified as a bank by APRA, giving 13 entities in total. St. George is now owned by Commonwealth Bank, but we include this separately, as it was a separately listed bank to end 2008. These 13 entities include the 4 'major' banks and 9 smaller / regional banks. Accord Advanced credit risk requirements).
VaR and CVaR Methodology
We use all 3 VaR methodologies (parametric, historical and Monte Carlo simulation) as described in Section 3. We calculate returns using the logarithm of price relatives every day for each year. For total bank portfolios, we use an undiversified approach, 
Structural Methodology
We apply Merton methodology per Section 3. Using equity returns and the relationship between equity and assets per section 3, we estimate an initial asset return. Daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated for every day.
Following KMV, this is repeated until asset returns converge. CVaR methodology is incorporated into the structural model to obtain CDD and CPD as per Section 3.
Testing for size significance.
We use 3 methods. Firstly, we test for correlation between size (natural logarithm of assets as per our regression equation discussed further on in this section) and our four risk measures.
Secondly, we split our data into 'major' banks and 'other' banks and use F tests to compare share price volatility and market asset volatility between the two size categories, testing for significance at both the 95% and 99% levels. We use $40 billion market capitalisation as the cut-off point for defining a 'major' bank, as this point ensures all regions 3 banks included in the comparison. Here we also examine the extent to which risk increased during the GFC period as compared to pre-GFC for 'major' banks and for 'other' banks.
Thirdly, we undertake a panel data regression analysis to ascertain whether size is a significant determinant of bank risk in conjunction with other variables. Using our risk measures as dependant variables, we undertake separate regressions for each of our four regions (Australia, Canada, Europe and US). We use a time (t) and bank (i) fixed effects model (confirmed via Hausman test to be the most appropriate option)
with panel data for each bank for each of the years in our dataset (2000 -2008) .
Drawing on key prior studies we include the following variables: and Tier 1 Capital ratio as an alternative to Equity ratio. We selected ROE and Equity as they provided a slightly better fit in term of R 2 than the alternate measures, and to avoid multicollinearity we excluded the alternate measures. Also note that CLL was applied to Australia only, due to insufficient availability of this data for other regions.
A variety of lags were applied to each of the variables, but no lagging of variables significantly improved any of the outcomes and lags are thus not reported. The results are shown in table 3. R 2 is shown at 3 levels; firstly excluding NPL and GVaR, secondly excluding GVaR only, and thirdly including all variables.
Results and Discussion
We found strong correlation (99% significance) between outcomes of the 3 different VaR and CVaR modelling techniques (parametric, historical and Monte Carlo), a key reason being our large number of historical observations, as well as the large number of forward simulations (20,000). As there is no significant difference between these methods, to avoid excessively detailed reporting we will restrict our discussion and tables to one method (parametric) for VaR and CVaR. The correlations between size and risk are shown in Table 1 . None of the correlations in any of the regions are significant, and the signs differ between regions with a negative relationship for Australia, Canada and Europe, as compared to positive for the US. confidence level using an F test), however the extent of the increase in tail risk was actually larger for the 'majors' (2.14x for CVaR and 2.11x for CStdev) than for 'other' (1.66x for CVaR and 1.95x for CStdev), which is opposite to the increases seen in Canada and Europe. The significance of the differential between CStdev for the 'major' banks and the 'other' banks in Australia falls from the 99% level pre-GFC to the 95% level during the GFC period. In Canada there is a significant differential in asset value fluctuations between 'other' and 'major' banks both pre and during the GFC, but there is no significant difference between the two groups of banks in VaR and CVaR. In Europe 'other' banks are more risky than 'majors' on all measures with this differential increasing during the GFC. In the US, the increase in all measures was fairly similar for 'majors' and 'other' banks, with GFC asset value fluctuations being similar across both groups. It should be noted of course, that as we are looking at asset value fluctuations our study only includes listed groups, and (with the notable exception of Lehman Brothers) the large number of financial institution failures are predominantly smaller unlisted entities. If we consider all 4 regions as a whole, the large increases in our risk measurements (from Pre-GFC to GFC) are widespread (but to a lesser degree in Canada and Australia), across all categories of banks in our study. Larger banks experienced significant difficulties such as access to wholesale funding (all regions), writedown of investments in sub-prime mortgages (mainly US and Europe), and exposure to corporate loan losses (all regions). Many smaller entities also had problems accessing funding. These entities generally also had relatively large exposures to the home loan market which was impacted by rising unemployment and falling house prices, particularly in the US and Europe. Many of the smaller banks also had large exposures to a falling commercial property market.
Thus all categories of banks, small and large, experienced problems during the GFC. Table 3 shows the results of our fixed effects panel regression analysis as per the methodology described in Section 4.4. The discussion following the tables will show that Size is not a significant determinant of risk and that other independent variables, particularly NPL and GVaR, are much more significant than Size. For all regions, the results show that size is not a significant item for any of the four regions. Indeed, the model for all other independent variables excluding NPL and GVaR does not provide a good explanation for VaR with R 2 ranging between only 0.40 (Canada) and 0.58 (US) but a better explanation for DD ranging from 0.55 (Canada) to 0.78 (US). This increases substantially when including NPL, with VaR ranging from 0.51 (Canada) to 0.79 (US) and DD ranging from 0.68 (Canada) to 0.79 (US). R 2 increases further for Australia (VaR 0.81, DD 0.83) and Canada (VaR 0.91, DD 0.70) when including GVaR. Although, on its own GVaR is a significant indicator of Australian VaR and DD, when including NPL, significant R 2 can be generated from the characteristics of these banks themselves. The findings are generally consistent with the studies mentioned earlier in this section which found that (NPL aside) balance sheet and income statement factors are not a good indicator of bank risk and that external shocks caused by global contagion (as measured by GVaR in our study) can have a significant impact. Across all regions, NPL is a significant determinant of VaR and PD. Equity (Australia and US) and LA (Europe and US) are significant in two regions each, but not in the other regions. In the US and UK, ROE is more significant than in Australia and Canada, likely because US and UK banks had significant losses over these volatile times, in line with VaR increases, whereas Australian and Canadian Banks remained profitable.
There is consistency in signs (+ or -) for all 4 regions for ROE and Equity (profitable banks with higher equity showing less risk), but no consistency among other variables. For example, Size is positively related to risk for the US but negatively for other regions.
Conclusions
Neither correlation nor regression analysis show significance in association between size and risk. When splitting banks into 'major' banks and 'other' banks, size does have some significance, but the signs vary between regions. Thus, overall, the study finds no conclusive evidence of association between size and risk.
